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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
LETTIE DELL BROCK,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
DEAN 0. WARD and STATE
FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Case No.
12737

Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is an action by respondent to recover damages
she sustained in a motor vehicle accident in Weber
County, Utah, involving a car driven by respondent and
a truck driven by appellant Dean 0. Ward, with appellant State Farm .Mutual Automobile Insurance Company involved by virtue of its uninsured motorist coverage with respondent.
DISPOSITION IN LO,iVER COURT
Prior to the date of trial appellants filed a Motion
for Summary Judgment which was denied by the Hon-
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arable .T ohn F. 'Vahlquist on .July 10, 1970. On Sep.
tember 20, 1971, a jury was impanelled to try the case
with the Honorable Calvin Gould presiding. The jury
returned a verdict awarding respondent $15,000.00 general damages and $5,145.84 as special damages. Judg·
ment was entered by the Court awarding respondent
$10,000.00 jointly and severally against ·both appellantl
and an additional $10,145.84 as against appellant Dean
0. \Vard only. During the trial of the case appellants
moved the Court for a directed verdict, for an order of
dismissal and for judgment notwithstanding the
which were all denied by Judge Calvin Gould. Appel·
lants thereafter appealed from the judgment of the
Court entered on the verdict.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmation of the jury verdict
and the judgment entered thereon by the Court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent is a mature married woman who was
45 years old at the time of the subject accident (R.
155) . Her general health was very good as was her
eyesight (R. 138). Her eyes were checked within three
months of the subject accident and she passed the test
without anv need for glasses and without any restric·
tions on h;r driver's license (R. 139). On the morning
of July 17, 1968, respondent left her home in
Willard, Utah, and was traveling in a southeasterly di·

a
rection on U.S. 91 toward Ogden City and the Defense
Depot where she was employed ( R. 138, 139) . She had
no reason to hurry because it only took her 10 to 15
minutes to drive to work. The accident occurred at 7 :05
a.m. and she started work at 7:30 a.m. (R. 138, 156).
She was proceeding in the outside lane of a four
lane highway at a speed of 55 miles per hour in a 65
mile per hour speed zone ( R. 139) . She testified that
as she proceeded in a southeasterly direction nothing
happened to distract her attention and that she was looking straight ahead prior to the accident in question (R.
139, 140). The road was dry, the weather was clear and
the road was level ( R. 140) .
A short time earlier appellant Dean 0. Ward had
stopped a truck on the edge of the h i g h w a y
to talk to a friend and had left its left rearend
feet
out into the outside lane of traffic (R. 160). Mrs.
Brock testified that she was approximately a quarter of
a mile away from the parked truck when she first
noticed it and that it appeared to be completely off the
road ( R. 150) . In this connection, the following testimony is pertinent (R. 150}:
"Q.

In other words, when you first saw the
truck you formed the opinion, or it appeared to you when you were a quarter
of a mile away from it that it was off
the

''A.

Yes.

"Q.

And you watched the truck as you drove
toward it?

"A.

Yes, I watched the whole road as I drove
down the road."

Respondent testified that as she drove down the
road the sun was somewhat glarey but she could see the
truck and it appeared off the road. Then as she got
;ithin a short distance of the truck the sun came up
completely from behind a peak causing her momentary
blindness while her eyes adjusted to the sudden light.
In this connection she testified as follows (R. 140, 141):
"Q.

Okay. Now, as you proceeded down the
highway going fifty-five miles an hour
in the outside lane, just tell us what happened.

"A.

Well, about a block, approximately,
ahead of me I noticed a truck parked off
the road. It appeared to be off the road.
But the sun kind of glared. It was just
coming up over behind a peak. And all
the way along that truck appeared to be
off the road entirely. When I got within a short distance, the sun came full
boom over the mountain, and my eyes had
to adjust to it. I couldn't-the truck appeared to be off the road. I assumed it
it was. But mv eves had to adjust to the
sun coming
I guess, because that
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truck appeared to be completely off the
road.''
Respondent further testified ( R. 141) :
"Q.

Now, as you traveled this road each
morning, are you familiar with the sun's
conditions?

"A.

Yes.

"Q.

And just describe what happens as the
sun makes its last move over the top of
the mountain, as it comes over.

"A.

Well, it is very sudden. There is just a
sudden glare all at once. And your eyes
are not adjusted to the bright light. It
takes a few seconds to adjust to them.

"Q.

Now then what happened as your eyes
were adjusting? What happened then?

"A.

I crashed into the back of the truck."

Trooper B. D. 'Vilcox testified that he was familiar with the stretch of road in question and that at that
time of the morning traveling in that direction it is
momentarily difficult to see when the sun pop• over the
mountain ( R. 162) .
Another witness, Vesta Mcllvried, testified that
she was familiar with the stretch of road in question
and had traveled it for many years ( R. 170) . She further testified ( R. 171) :
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"A.

As the sun comes up over the mountain,
you see the sun out in the area. And as it
comes to your car and hits the hood of the
car and the windshield, there is a very
definite glare and a sudden burst of sunlight.

"Q.

And what does that do to your eyes
normally?

"A.

Well, the glare, it is a second or two before your eyes are accustomed to that
glare."

As a result of the accident in question, Mrs. Brock
sustained lacerations to her face and a fracture of the
acetabulum with subsequent destructive arthrosis in·
valving the right hip. Dr. 'Vallace E. Hess performed
a mold arthroplasty on the right hip and gave her a 40%
permanent disability of the right lower extremity at the

hip.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
RESPONDENT'S CONDUCT WAS
NOT NEGLIGENT AS A l\tlATTER OF
LA"T AND THE COURT PROPERLY
SUBMITTED THE :MATTER TO THE
JURY AS A QUESTION OF FACT.
Appellant State Farm Mutual Automobile In·
surance Company demanded a jury trial in its Notice

of Readiness for Trial:' The verdict in favor of respondent was a unanimous one by all jurors who heard
the case. Appellants are dissatisfied with the verdict and
seek to overturn the same by arguing that respondent's
conduct is a question of law for the court instead of a
question of fact for the_jury (R. 111).
The first trial judge to disagree with appellants'
contention was The Honorab]e John F. Wahlquist, who
denied appellants' Motion for Summary Judgment
argued several weeks prior to the trial (R. 43) . The
second Judge to disagree with appellants' position was
The Honorable Calvin Gould, who was the trial judge
that heard the case. After extensive arguments by respective counsel, Judge Gould denied appellants' MoDirected Verdict, Motion to Dismiss, and Motion
tion for Judgment Notwithstanding The Verdict (R.
125). Appellants make no contention that the jury was
improperly instructed.
The rule that respondent is entitled to have the
Court review the evidence and all reasonable inferences
fairly to be dra\\-n therefrom in the light most favorable
to her is axiomatic. As to questions of fact or law this
Court said in Cooper v. Evans, 1 Utah 2d 68, 262 P.2d
278 at page 280:
"Contributory negligence would only be a
question of law where the evidence showed,
with such certainty that reasonable minds could
not differ thereon, that the conduct in question
either met or failed to meet the standard of
due care. But where there is uncertainty as to
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whether such standard has been met so that
reasonable minds could differ upon it, the question of whether such negligence exists is not a
matter of law, but is one for the jury to determine."
This Court in the recent case of W eilenmann t.
Morrell, 491 P.2d 1208 ( 1971), indicated as follows:
"This is a classic case for Solomon, but
under our jury system, unless there is an obvious abuse of the mythical reasonable man's
role in our jurisprudence, that, right or wrong,
we invest the arbiter of the facts with Solomonic wisdom. So saying, we could have said
that had the jury decided otherwise, so had we
have done."
In the very recent case of Gibbons v. Orem City
Corporation, 493 P .2d 1280 ( 1972), this Court said
at page 1282:
"In vacating the summary judgment and remanding the case for a trial, this court
expressed its awareness and approval of the
thought that a jury of lay persons is peculiarly
advantaged to determine questions relating to
negligence and contributory negligence which
are tested by the standard of the ordinary,
reasonable and prudent person under the circumstances. We stated:
'Summary judgments are more frequently given in contract cases because of
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greater ease in determining the factual
issues .... However, when it comes to determining negligence, contributory negligence, and causation, courts are not in
such a good position . . . here enters a
prerogative of the jury to make a determination .. .'"
In 22 ALR 2d 310, the following rule is found
which reflects the modern thinking of the courts on
this issue considering modern traffic conditions:
"Finding the rule requiring a driver
blinded by lights to stop or proceed at his peril
impracticable under modern traffic conditions,
a number of courts have repudiated or refused
to adopt it, applying instead the more flexible
standard of ordinary care under the circumstances, and holding that a motorist who continues on his course when his vision is
interfered with by other lights cannot be held
guilty of negligence as a matter of law."
In Trimble v. Union Pacific Stages, 105 Utah 457,
142 P.2d 674, where the automobile in which plaintiff's
decedent was riding had been pulled onto the highway
after sliding off the slippery pavement in a dense fog,
at night, and while parked on the left shoulder of the
highway and was struck by a bus, this court held that
the bus driver was not negligent as a matter of law.
This court recognized that there is a brief period of

lo

blindness which commonly follows a sudden and unexpected exposure to bright light. This court then listed ,
other cases where there was no negligence as a matter
of law involving obscured vision by dust, sudden failure
of headlights, blindness by the lights of approaching
automobiles, visibility affected by a dark rainy day
and the headlights of oncoming traffic, and inclement
weather involving darkness, mist, rain, and fog.

In Hitchcodc v. Tosta, 153 CA 2d 432, 314 P.2d
513, the California District Court of Appeal was confronted with a situation where plaintiff's truck driver
had parked his truck and trailer with the left wheels
about two feet off of the main traveled portion of the
highway against the edge of the mountain. The main
traveled portion of the highway was 16 to 17 feet wide.
The defendant was driving 50 to 60 miles per hour on
a curved, mountainous road which he had traveled many
times and knew, or should have known that trucks cus·
tomarily stopped and parked where the particular truck
in question was stopped. The defernlant was blinded by
the rising sun and could not see clearly ahead and did
not see the truck and trailer. The front of the defendant's automobile hit the left rear of' the trailer with such :
force that the trailer axle of forged steel was bent for·
ward to about a ai> angle. The California court held
that the issues of negligence and contributory negligence
were questions of fact and were properly submitted to
the jury. In this connection see 42 ALR 2d 164, where
it is stated:
0
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"In a number of cases involving a collision
with a parked or standing vehicle where rain
was at lesat one factor in visibility, it has been
held that the question of the motorists's contributory negligence was for the trier of fact."
In the 1956 Utah case of Ihetz v. Anderson, 5 Utah
2d 290, 300 P.2d 642, where an overturned automobile
was on the east half of a paved road and where the
driver of a truck parked his truck and was preparing
to set out flares to warn other drivers and where plaintiff smashed into the overturned car because she could
not see it as she was temporarily blinded by the lights
of the truck on the opposite side, this court said at page
648 of the opinion:
"The rule that a motorist is normally required to so operate his machine as to be able
to see and avoid substantial discernible objects
in the road ahead is generally recognized, as is
its concommitant that the motorist must equip
his machine with proper headlights and be able
to stop within the distance of the lights' projection. However, this does not mean that a
motorist striking an object in the highway is
guilty of negligence as a matter of law under
any and all conditions."
In the Fretz case, the Utah Supreme Court reiterated the rule that it was negligence as a matter of law
for a person to drive an automobile upon a public highway and not be able to stop within the distance at which
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the operator of said car is able to see objects upon the
highway in front of him. This court then stated the
modified version of this rule with the following language at page 648 of the opinion:
"But this case has been modified by subsequent
cases permitting the jury to determine, in the
light of existing conditions, what a reasonable
and prudent person would do under the circumstances."
In the recent case of Durrant v. l'elton, 16 Utah 2d
7, 394 P.2d 879, where defendant ran into the rear end
of plaintiff's car which was stalled in the outside lane
of two southbound lanes of a four lane highway after
dark during a snowstorm. This court said at page 881:
"However, the test as to what constitutes a
proper lookout is usually . . . a latter-day
classic question for jury determination ... A
jury should determine what a reasonable and
prudent person would do under the conditions
as they existed at the time of the accident."
In Federated .:Jfilk Producer's Association, Inc. v.
Statewide Plu,mbing and Heating Company, 11 Utah
2d 295, 358 P.2d 348, where plaintiff's truck was driving on Redwood Road after dark at approximately 35
miles per hour and struck a windrow of dirt covering
most of the east traffic lane and reaching a height of
four to five feet, this court said at page 350 of the
opinion:
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"The unseeability of substantial objects
on the highway in time to avoid an accident
may depend on many things other than inattention, faulty headlights, or failure to give
heed to what was there to be seen. A sudden
heavy smoke, fog, snow or rain storm, lightning or approaching headlights or a combination of some or all of these elements coupled
with the negligence of the other party, may
make an accident unavoidable regardless of
how alert and competent a driver is or how
well equipped his car is with brakes, lights and
other necessary appliances. The visibility of
substantial objects may depend on their size,
shape, color or whether they absorb or reflect
light or blend with or stand out in contrast to
the background. To be alert to all surrounding
conditions, to have good eyesight, to have
proper headlights and brakes and to keep the
vehicle under relatively safe control are all
very important, but under some circumstances
all of these things are not sufficient to enable
a reasonably prudent driver to avoid an
dent."
said:

And further at page 351 of the opinion the court

"Under these facts and circumstances defendant has failed to make a showing that a
refusal to find that plaintiff's driver did not
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use due care to avoid this accident would be
unreasonable. So a question of fact for the
jury on this issue was presented and not one of
law for the court."
Appellants rely on the guest case of Hillyard v.
Utah By-Products Co .. 1 Utah 2d 143, 263 P.2d 287,
where a truck driver for the defendant company parked
the truck in front of his home with its rear end extend·
ing five feet out into the paved portion of the street.
The driver of the car which crashed into the truck had
been drinking beer, passed one car at 85 miles per hour
in a 25 mile per hour zone. continued to accelerate to 50
miles per hour passing two other cars, and in passing a
third car and seeing that he would be una·ble to do so
because of oncoming traffic, he then swung to the right
striking the parked truck. Action was then brought for
the death of the guest passenger. 'l'his court said at
page 289 of the opinion:
"From the facts shown as to the manner
in which deceased's host drjver Aston operated
his car, passing the cars at 50 miles per hour
in a 25 mile per hour zone with a bottle of beer
in one hand, there is no doubt that there was
sufficient evidence to make a jury question
both as to his negligence, and as to whether it
was a proximate cause of the collision."
It would seem that if this is a jury question, the
case at bar is obviously one. Mrs. Brock was in her
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proper lane of traffic, traveling under the posted speed
limit, looking straight ahead, and was not imbibing alcoholic beverages. Because of a slight sunglare appellants' truck appeared to her to be completely off the
side of the road and as she approached closer the sun
came completely over the mountain momentarily blinding her just prior to impact. We submit that the Hillyard case supports respondent's position that the subject
case was properly submitted to the jury as a question
of fact.
Appellants rely on Anderson v. Parson Red-EMix Paving Company. Inc., 24 Utah 2d 128, 467 P.2d
45, where a 15-year-old guest passenger was riding with
a 15-year-old boy who had taken an automobile without
leave and while traveling down Main Street in Brigham
City accelerated in order to avoid collision with a vehicle
he had failed to see and over-accelerated causing the
car to go into a sideways slide thereafter striking the
extending steel chute of a cement truck which was
parked on the side of the road. This court said at page
47 of the opinion that:
". . . there was nothing either to obstruct the
vision or distrad the attention of the hostdriver Kim Mortenson. . . There is really no
good reason why he should have lost control
of his vehicle as is suggested."
The fact situation in this case is hardly comparable
to the Brock case where Mrs. Brock was driving in a
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normal fashion and is further distinguishable since
there was no sun problem in the Anderson case.
Appellants rely on Velasquez v. Greyhound Lines,
Inc., 12 Utah 2d 379, 366 P.2d 989, where a passenger
of a bus filed suit for injuries sustained when the bus
collided with the rear of a semitrailer stopped on the
highway. The truck stopped alongside of a car having
tire trouble leaving the back end of the truck protruding into the street approximately seven feet. The driver
started loading the flat tires into the tire rack of his
truck, with the truck's clearance lights, stop lights and
blinker lights turned on. The court observed" ... even if
the truck had been aflame, it could have given him no
more information". The bus driver knew of the position
of the truck and car and testified he intended to stop
behind the truck to render assistance and to add the bene·
fit of his lights to the scene. Then for some unexplained
reason the bus driver momentarily lost consciousness by
either falling asleep or blacking out and collided with
the truck. This fact situation is hardly similar to the
Brock case since there was no sun factor involved, Mrs.
Brock did not know the exact location of the stopped
vehicle, she was not planning to stop and render as·
sistance, nor did she momentarily lose consciousness
prior to the accident.
Appellants cite Hirschbach v. Dubuque Packing
Co., 7 Utah 2d 7, 316 P.2d 319, where respondents'
truck and trailer was stopped in the road after dark
with its tail lights on and appellants' driver observed
the tail lights in time to have stopped and avoided the
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collision. He knew the truck and trailer were in the road
but continued on thinking they were moving in the same
direction and ultimately struck the rear of the parked
truck and trailer. This case is distinguishable from the
Brock case in that there was no sun factor, the truck and
trailer were completely in the road in the Hirschbach
case, and the driver knew they were in the road which
is not the situation in the Brock case.
Appellants rely on Nagata v. Kahului Development Co., Ltd., 420 P .2d 103, where plaintiff driver
was traveling in a direct easterly direction into the rising
sun, was unable to see part of the road and ran into a
parked truck that was parked at an angle so that 7 feet
of it extended into the pavement. This case is distinguishable from the Brock case in that Mrs. Brock
had complete view of the entire road even though there
was a slight glare from the sun and her eyes told her
that the truck was completely off the traveled portion
of the pavement. The sun then came completely over
the mountain momentarily blinding her a short distance
prior to impact. In the Nagata case the plaintiff driver
never did see the stopped vehicle and it was her passenger husband who told her to look out. It should further be noted that in the Brock case Mrs. Brock was on
a through highway with a 65 mile per hour speed limit
and in the Nagata case the driver was traveling in the
City of Kahului, Maui, on her way to take her son to
school in a residential area and traveling at a speed of
only 20 to 25 miles per hour.
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CONCLUSION
Mrs. Brock was a mature married woman traveling
to work in her proper lane of traffic, well under the
speed limit of 65 miles per hour on a through highway,
had no reason to hurry, was looking straight ahead having excellent eyesight, and was aware of the parked
truck in front of her which appeared to be completely
off the road. There was a slight glare from the sun
which had not completely come over the mountain. As
she approached the stopped vehicle the sun suddenly
came completely over the mountain momentarily causing her eyes to adjust to it and the collision then occurred. The trial judges said that her conduct was a
question of fact for the jury and not one of law for the
court. Eight jurors unanimously returned a verdict for
her after hearing all of the witnesses on the issues of
liability. Appellants had their day in court and it is re·
spectfully submitted that the verdict and the court's
judgment entered thereon be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
FROERER, HOROWITZ,
PARKER, RICHARDS,
THORNLEY & CRITCHLOW
Richard H. Thornley

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
2610 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah
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